Intra-Party Democracy and Party Responsiveness

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This study examines whether parties respond to their supporters or to the median voter position. Party leaders require the support of the 'selectorate', which is defined as the group that has influence in party leadership selection (Bueno de Mesqiuta et al. 2002, 2003). Inclusive parties, which rely on rank-and-file membership to select their leadership, will respond to their members. Exclusive parties, who rely on office-seeking members for leadership selection, will respond to the median voter position. Thus, intra-party institutions that (dis)enfranchise party members are crucial for understanding whether a party responds to their supporters (or to the median voter position). Using data from 1972-2003 for six West-European countries, I report findings that inclusive parties respond to the mean party supporter position. While there is evidence that exclusive parties respond to the median voter position in two-party systems, this finding does not extend to multiparty systems. This study has implications for our understanding of intra-party institutions and political representation.

How do parties adjust their policy positions? During the last fifteen years, scholars have adopted an intra-party politics approach to address this question (Müller and Strøm 1999; Schofield and Sened 2005; Budge et al. 2010; Meyer 2010). Müller and Strøm (1999: 18) introduce leadership accountability as a factor that may affect policy positions. Recently, Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis (2011) take up the finding of Ezrow et al. (2011) that niche parties, i.e., parties from the Nationalist, Communist and Green party families, respond to the mean party supporter whereas mainstream parties respond to shifts in the mean voter. While Ezrow et al. (2011; see also Adams et al. 2006) propose that the crucial mainstream-niche distinction is based on attachments to ideology, Schumacher et al. (2011) argue that intra-party organisational strength matters, namely, that activist-dominated organisations induce responsiveness to the mean party supporter, and leadership-dominated parties are associated with responsiveness to the mean voter.

I extend the general scholarship on intraparty institutions by evaluating the effects of the intra-party franchise. In particular, I argue party leaders adopt positions that are consistent with the preferences of their "selectorate", or the "set of people who have an institutional say in choosing leaders" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002: 560; see also Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003: 41-43). Party members value office and policy; however, since office payoffs exceed policy payoffs, candidates are willing to sacrifice their policy ideals for office. Hence, candidates are motivated to respond to rank and file party members to the extent that these members have influence in selecting them. If office-motivated party members dominate the leadership selection, then parties should respond to the median voter. By contrast, if the policy-motivated rank and file members dominate the party leadership selection, then parties will respond to shifts in their core supporters. Thus, intra-party institutions are decisive with respect to which groups they enfranchise in the leadership selection.

These hypotheses are tested employing data from six European countries between 1972 and 2003. The analysis reveals inclusive parties are indeed different from exclusive parties in terms of

responsiveness to its mean supporter.[1] In addition, there is evidence that exclusive parties respond to mean voter opinion shifts in two-party systems, however, this finding does not extend to multiparty systems.

These results are important for several reasons. First, these findings have important implications for the study of political representation. In general theories of democracy, citizen preferences are linked to public policy via a "chain of responsiveness" (Powell 2004), although this 'chain' may be altered or distorted by institutional characteristics (e.g., majority-manufacturing electoral systems). For aggregating citizen preferences, the chain relies heavily on the delegation of interests within parties (Müller 2000). This paper shows that whether parties represent their supporters depends on these internal institutions. Hence, we can add to the list of factors that attenuate the signal from citizens to representatives by pointing to the importance of institutions within parties.

Moreover, these findings have significant implications for coalition behavior. For instance, exclusive parties should be more flexible to accept compromises and hence more likely to be members of a coalition government. Similarly, inclusive parties should be less forbearing with its leaders if they implement unpopular policies from the party members' point of view, and less likely compromise their ideology to join a governing coalition. Hence, theories that combine intra-party politics and coalition politics (Giannetti and Benoit 2009) should analyse the effect of intra-party franchise too.

Finally, this study extends previous work on niche and mainstream parties (Meguid 2005, 2008; Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow et al. 2011), and provides an additional step toward understanding

[1] Below I argue to substitute the median party member's (voter's) position by the mean supporter's (voter's) position is necessary because they are obtained using 10 point-scales and hence median positions hardly change. Moreover, party members are very hard to identify in surveys, however, party supporters seem to be a good proxy for their opinions.

the niche party phenomenon. What is it about niche parties that promotes responsiveness to their core supporters? The implication of this study is that it may be inclusiveness rather than attachments to ideology that promotes niche responsiveness to their supporters.

Hypotheses

Below, it is argued first that party members have office- and policy-seeking motivations, and that office-seeking motivations outweigh policy-seeking motivations. If this is the case it is then argued that the number of party members that select the candidates (i.e., the size of the selectorate) for office is crucial, because large selectorates induce responsiveness to the mean party member, and small selectorates incentivise responsiveness to the median voter position.

Individual Vote Choices: How Office Outweighs Policy

What motivates individuals to form parties? Addressing this question may bring us closer to understanding how parties adopt their policies. According to Laver (1997: 85), political parties are set up because "political entrepreneurs" solve problems that are "beyond the resources of a single individual". There are incentives to ally with other political entrepreneurs. But what do these political entrepreneurs strive for when participating in a political party? Downs (1957: 30) assumes they are office-seeking. However, sole office-proneness seems not to be a sufficient explanation for party membership if one considers that millions of individuals are party members even though the number of offices – party-internal as well as party-external – is much smaller. Therefore, it is also convenient to assume that “citizens of democracies become politically engaged because these [policy] choices matter” (Müller and Strøm 1999: 8). Consequently, policy and office motivate individual political entrepreneurs.

In the following, I assume that party members maximize utility by obtaining policy and office payoffs. Limiting the analysis to one policy-dimension, each individual has a personal ideal

position that she prefers to be implemented over all alternatives. Moreover, the further the implemented policy is away from her ideal point, the less utility she receives.

With respect to office payoffs, I distinguish between three types of offices: intra-party offices, the party leadership, and electoral offices like becoming an MP or member of cabinet. With Downs's office-seeking politician in mind, these offices are ordered in terms of 'payoffs' from lowest to highest.[2] Suppose two candidates compete for party leadership. Whoever is elected can select the party's policy position. Additionally, the winner can appoint party members to intra-party offices and nominate candidates for electoral offices.

The candidates, L and R, choose the opposing and most extreme positions on the single policy dimension, positions L and position R. An individual that shares L's preference for position L, will – in the absence of office offers – always vote for L because L is closer to her ideal position than R. The individual is motivated by the policy offers of candidates (*policy-motivated*). By contrast, if R offers her an intra-party office and L offers no office at all, the individual will – despite the significant policy difference – vote for R. The same pattern holds if R offers an electoral office (the second ranked office) and L offers only an intra-party office. In each case, the individual is *office-motivated*.[3]

[2] Furthermore and to make the following explanation simpler, suppose that even intra-party offices are appealing enough to exceed the maximal amount of policy payoffs, and additionally, an electoral office yields more payoffs than an intra-party office and the individual's ideal position combined. Finally, even if an individual is sure to be nominated by her party for a certain electoral office, her assumption of office is subject to her party performing sufficiently well in the upcoming elections. We can apply these assumptions to a political party environment to understand how they influence decisions within parties.

[3] In case of L providing the better office as well as the better policy offers to the individual, she will of course vote for L. However, her motivation to do so is not clear. She may be solely office-motivated, solely policy-motivated or motivated by both incentives. Also, in the event of one or both candidates making an electoral

To clarify, individuals in political parties have policy preferences which they would prefer to be implemented. However, they are willing to sacrifice their ideal policies if they are offered office. Now we turn to how this pattern affects parties' policy positions via leadership elections.

Aggregating Individual Vote Choices: Why Institutions Matter

I assume the number of candidates in party leadership elections is restricted, for simplicity, to two. A candidate is elected if she is supported by a majority of the selectorate. Following Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s *Selectorate Theory* (2002, 2003), I define the selectorate as the subgroup of party members which takes part in the party leadership selection. In the majority of cases, this selection process is a formal election, however there are parties that use informal selection mechanisms (Kenig 2009: 435-436).

For clarification, I depict three types of selectorate. First, there are small selectorates of up to, say, fifteen party members, who are also viable candidates for electoral offices. In this instance, both candidates offer electoral offices to all members of their selectorate. In addition, they propose office-seeking positions since this maximises their odds of winning the inter-party elections for all nominees. The implementation of the office-seeking position is possible only because the majority – in this case all members – of the selectorate make office-motivated choices and compromise on their ideal policies. The candidates act similarly. As a result, the party's policy position is office-seeking (i.e., the median voter position).

Since selectors are party members, it is reasonable to assume that the median selector's ideal position is close to the median party member's position. The office-seeking position is more complicated to derive. In a two-party framework, this position will most certainly be the median voter

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office offer that is not certain to be realised, the individual estimates how likely it is that the party will perform sufficiently well given the corresponding policy position the candidate suggests.

(Downs 1957: 118). In a multi-party setting, the office-seeking position may be the vote-seeking position as in the two-party case. However, there exist centrifugal incentives due to other electoral systems and more competitors (Cox 1990a, 1990b; Merrill and Adams 2002; Adams and Merrill 2006) as well as coalition formation (Schofield 1993). Nevertheless, the median voter remains important in multi-party systems as well (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988). Thus, it is convenient to equalise it with the median voter's position.

In the second and opposite case, the selectorate comprises all party members who are all entitled to vote in party leadership elections. In this case, the vast majority of selectorate members will make its vote decision with regard to policies. Thus, the only position that secures that a candidate will not definitely lose the intra-party election is that of the median selector which is the median party member. Therefore, the candidates' willingness to sacrifices their ideal positions leads, in this case, to the median member's policy position which I label the 'policy-seeking' position.

Finally, the third type of selectorate is a mix of the former two cases. Imagine, for instance, a party conference that is composed of delegates from local party branches. Usually, such a party conference assembles up to a few hundred party members. Now, a more complex situation evolves. In the mixed setting, there are not enough offices a candidate could distribute to make half of the selectors office-motivated. An office-seeking position, on the one hand, will not secure winning the leadership election. On the other hand, if candidates have some offices to distribute, i.e., enough offices to appoint a significant share of selectors but less than of half of them, candidates can use office appointments strategically. For instance, a candidate may achieve his personally preferred policy position by 'buying off' selectors far away from his ideal position. As shown before, selectors who expect to be appointed to office, i.e., office-motivated selectors, compromise policy for office payoffs and will vote for the candidate irrespective of his policy proposal. Moreover, those selectors close to the candidate's ideal position will support him because of his policy ideals. As a result, the candidate's dominant strategy is no longer to propose the median selector's ideal policy.

The discussion above points to the importance of the 'offices-to-selectors' ratio within the party. As this ratio increases, the more selectors can be 'bribed' with office payoffs and, in turn, the fewer selectors rely on policy considerations when making their vote choice. Hence, the greater the offices-to-selectors ratio the further away can a candidate's winning policy position be from the median selector's ideal position. Since candidates are office motivated, the more will the policy position, moreover, be closer to the median voter position. On the other hand, as the offices-to-selectors ratio approaches zero, policy-motivations dominate selectors' vote decisions and positioning at the median selector position becomes the dominant strategy for candidates. Thus, two hypotheses follow:

Hypothesis 1 (Inclusiveness Hypothesis): Inclusive parties that are characterised by a relatively low offices-to-selectors ratio respond to shifts in the position of the median party member.

Hypothesis 2 (Exclusiveness Hypothesis): Exclusive parties that are characterised by a relatively high offices-to-selectors ratio respond to shifts in the position of the median voter.

Data and Measurement

Testing these hypotheses requires developing measures of: parties' policy positions; offices-to-selectors ratios; median party positions; and the median voter in a country election year.

Parties' Policy Positions. The only comprehensive data set on party positions is provided by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP; Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). It places parties' election manifestos from all over the world on a left-right scale ranging from -100 for extreme left

parties to 100 for extreme right parties. In order to obtain this scale, coders read each party's election manifesto and portioned its content in 56 predefined quasi-sentence categories. Basing on the relative frequency of as 'left' and 'right' defined categories, each party manifesto's position on the left-right scale is computed. Consequently, the unit of observation is party election years.

Offices-to-selectors ratio. Since it is very difficult to obtain the exact number of selectors for parties, I use an ordinal rather than in absolute scale. Moreover, due to the way selectorate sizes are measured, it is not necessary to obtain the number of offices separately.

In particular, I utilise a scale that – similar to the theoretical classification above (inclusive and exclusive) – distinguishes, based on their formal institutions in leadership selections, between two types of selectorates. Applying a six-point classification of party leadership selection procedures proposed by Kenig (2009), I rely on Katz and Mair's (1992) *Data Handbook of Party Organizations* in which country experts compile institutional arrangements of various parties for a time period from 1960 until 1990. Kenig's categories 'Party Members' and 'Selected Party Agency' are coded as inclusive (variable is coded as 1), whereas categories 'Parliamentary Party Group' and 'Party Elite' are coded as exclusive (coded as 0).[4]

There are two scenarios that lead to a party being coded as s inclusive: On the one hand, if all party members can elect the party leader – either because all members are entitled to vote in the party conference selecting the party leader or because there are grass root elections – I categorise a party as 'inclusive'; On the other hand, parties that select their party leaders via delegates are considered 'inclusive' too if delegates to the party conference are represent local party branches.

An inclusive party is assigned the value 1 on the inclusiveness scale. Due to the size of

[4] The categories 'Electorate' and 'Single Individual' do not exist in the data at hand. Furthermore, the category 'Party Elite' drops out in the final analyses.

modern parties it is obviously the corresponding category to the 'policy-motivated party' that is defined by its very small offices-to-selectors ratio. Thus, I expect the Inclusiveness Hypothesis to hold true for this party.

In contrast, if the selection process is dominated – ex offico – by the parliamentary party, I assign it the value 0 for the inclusiveness dummy and label it 'exclusive'. Considering that members of the parliamentary party hold an electoral office and that these groups are – compared to the overall party membership – relatively small, they fit well with the theoretical definition of the 'office-motivated party' and its offices-to-selectors ratio greater than or equal to one half. Therefore, I expect the Exclusiveness Hypothesis to hold for this type of party.

For some cases which Kenig (2009) classifies, there was either no indication of how the party leader is elected (Labour and Conservatives in the UK) in the *Data Handbook* (Katz and Mair 1992) or elections took place after 1991. In this event, I use Kenig's data to assign inclusiveness scores.[5]

Median Voter Position. Following earlier research (Adams et al. 2004; Adams and Ezrow 2009; Ezrow et al. 2011; Schumacher et al. 2011), data on the electorate's position on the left-right scale was obtained from Eurobarometer surveys (Schmitt et al. 2008). From 1972 onwards, each year between 1000 and 7000 respondents in each member state of the European Union were asked for their self-placement on a 1-10 point left-right scale. Using this item, I compute for every country year the mean voter self-placement. The mean self-placement is superior to the median self-

[5] Since Kenig's (2009) unit of observation is leadership selections and not general election years, I assign the 'youngest' last available value if a party was classified by Kenig within four years before the election year. As a results 18 cases (8%) are adopted from Kenig (2009). This is a convenient strategy as the correlation between Kenig's and my coding is high (r= .71).

placement because the latter hardly provides any variance. In fact, 70% of all country years score 5 in the median self-placement. The mean self-placement approximates the median self-placement as voters are on the whole normally distributed.

Median Party Member Position. Unfortunately respondents of the Eurobarometers have been asked if they were member of a political party in ten panels (1988-1991) only. Even though they were not asked what party they belonged to, they stated to which party they felt closest. Combining these pieces of information, I identify respondents who belong to a certain party and obtain – for the same reasons as above – their mean self-placement.

In order to use more than the 32 cases this time period provides, I have to rely on a proxy for party members' mean position. Indeed, the mean *party supporter's* self-placement, defined as the mean self-placement on the left-right scale of all respondents who state that they intended to vote for a certain party if next week was a general election, proves to be an excellent proxy for that party's *mean member's* self-placement. Their values are highly correlated (r =.94).[6]

If values for the mean voter's or the mean supporter's position cannot be computed due to missing data, the preceding year's values are assigned. If this value is also not available, the following year's values are used. Moreover, since the two utilised left-right measures are not equivalently

[6] Notice that it is possible to impute missing values for the mean member's self-placement by regressing the mean party member's position on its lagged value, changes in the mean supporter's position as well as the changes in the distance to the mean voter's position. However, even though the correlation between predicted and observed values is slightly higher (r= .95) than the corresponding measure for mean party supporters' and mean party member's position (r= .94), this strategy has a major caveat: A predicted value relies heavily on its precedent value. Given that the imputed values are not supposed to fill gaps, yet, they rather are the time series interpolated from a few observations, the risk of cumulative errors is high. Thus, I utilise the mean supporter's position.

scaled, I linearly rescale the CMP left-right scale to 1-10.[7]

In total, I obtain a data set including 30 panels of parties in six countries.[8] The time period covered is from 1972 through 2003. An exhaustive list of cases as well as categorisations of inclusiveness can be found in the appendix.

Model Specification and Estimation Techniques

Since it is reasonable to assume that parties respond consistently to any shift in public or their supporters' opinion, a linear model is the appropriate model to estimate. In order to evaluate the hypothesis, I specify a model of two interaction effects and their constitutive terms (Brambor et al. 2006). Therefore, the model reads:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&Change\ in\ party\ position\ (t-1\ to\ t) = \\
&\qquad = \beta_0 \\
&\qquad +\beta_1[Inclusiveness\ (t)] \\
&\qquad +\beta_2[Mean\ supporter\text{'s shift}\ (t-1\ to\ t)] \\
&\qquad +\beta_3[Inclusiveness\ (t)\ x\ mean\ supporter\text{'s shift}\ (t-1\ to\ t)] \\
&\qquad +\beta_4[Mean\ voter\text{'s shift}\ (t-1\ to\ t)] \\
&\qquad +\beta_5[Inclusiveness\ (t)\ x\ mean\ voter\text{'s shift}\ (t-1\ to\ t)]
\end{aligned}
$$

where

Change in party position (t-1 to t) = the change in a party's rescaled (10-point) CMP left-right

[7] To do so, I use the formula: ([*CMP value*] x (9/200)) + 5.5.

[8] These countries are: Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom and Ireland. For Italy data is available, yet, there is massive doubt about the validity of the CMP left-right scale (Pelizzo 2003). Thus, like Meyer (2010) and Schumacher et al. (2011) I exclude Italy from the analysis.

score between elections at (t-1) and (t).

Inclusiveness (t) = dummy equal unity if a party is inclusive at (t) and zero otherwise.

Mean supporter's shift (t-1 to t) = the change in the mean self-placements between election years (t-1) and (t) of respondents who state that they intend to vote for this party.

Mean voter's shift (t-1 to t) = the change in the mean self-placement of all Eurobarometer respondents in this country between election years (t-1) and (t).

For all variables expressing differences, positive values indicate policy shifts to the right and *vice versa*.

Due to the parties being observed at several consecutive elections, I treat the observation for parties as panels. Unfortunately, different estimation techniques for panel-data suffer from econometrics' chronic trade-off between efficiency and bias. In order to use the full capacity of advantages and control for disadvantages, I employ two different models: an ordinary Fixed Effects (FE) set-up as well as a Fixed Effects Generalised Least Squares (FEGLS) approach (Wooldridge 2010: 312-315). The FE technique is the gold-standard for applied panel-analysis. However, it has some disadvantages compared to the FEGLS methods, which I describe below.

I address autocorrelation since tests indicate the presence of first order autocorrelation.[9] In the FE set-up, I include a lagged dependent variable (LDV) to eliminate the serial correlation.[10] Three problems arise by employing an LDV. First, if included in an FE model, a bias is induced (Nickell 1981; Judson and Owen 1999). Second, LDVs capture some of the theoretically motivated variables' effects in the estimation (Achen 2000; Plümper et al. 2005). Finally, since there is not

[9] Regressing the residuals of the FE model on its prosecutors results in a negative and statically highly significant coefficient ($\beta = -0.32$, $p = 0.000$).

[10] Indeed, this eliminates auto-correlation. The corresponding coefficient (see last footnote) reduces to $\beta = -0.01$, $p = 0.831$).

always data on last election's policy shifts some observations are lost.[11] The main advantage of FEGLS over FE models is that it allows for a transformation of the variance-covariance matrix that corrects coefficients and standard errors for first-order autocorrelation. Thus, it does not suffer from one of the mentioned problems.

An additional consideration is that a standard test detects heteroscedasticity in the error terms.[12] Again, the solutions by each estimation technique differ. For the FE set-up the well known panel corrected standard errors can be used (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996). The FEGLS model allows us to estimate heteroscedasticity, and weight coefficients and variance-covariance matrix by a corresponding factor to adjust for the disturbance. As a result, standard errors are often more accurate and smaller than their panel-specific counterparts.

Despite the striking advantages of FEGLS over FE, there is an important caveat. Its properties for a small to medium amount of panels (there are 33 in this analysis) may be poor (Wooldridge 2010: 298). Hence, I will present findings of the more conservative FE model as well as the more desirable FEGLS model.

With respect to the hypotheses, the Inclusiveness Hypothesis is supported to the extent that the joint coefficient – on the [Mean supporter's shift (t-1 to t)] and [Inclusiveness (t) x mean supporter's shift (t-1 to t)] variables – exceeds zero and is statistically significant. Similarly, if the coefficient on the [Mean voter's shift (t-1 to t)] variable is statistically significant and positive, the Exclusiveness Hypothesis is corroborated.

[11] Seven observations are dropped.

[12] A likelihood-ratio test of the given model specification estimated by generalised least squares for panel data with and without controlling for panel heteroscedasticity clearly indicates that panel specific heteroscedasticity exists ($p = 0.004$).

Results

To ease substantive interpretation, note that except for [*Inclusiveness (t)*] and [*Niche*] all independent variables are on the same scale as the dependent variable. Also, positive coefficients on the [*Mean supporter's shift (t-1 to t)*] and [*Mean voter's shift (t-1 to t)*] variables indicate responsiveness to the mean supporter and the mean voter positions. Second, these coefficients are interpreted in terms of percentages. For example, if the coefficient for [*Mean supporter's shift (t-1 to t)*] equals 0.7, the party will follow its mean supporter's movement by 70%. Note, again, that this is to ease interpretation of the coefficients, and that it assumes that the public opinion data and the re-scaled CMP data are on substantively equivalent scales.

[Table 1 here]

Table 1 Column 1 contains the results of the baseline model described above, estimated with FEGLS.[13] Focussing on responsiveness to the mean party supporter first, the coefficient of -.55 on the [*Mean supporter's shift (t-1 to t)*] variable supports the finding that exclusive parties move, on average, in the opposite direction of their supporters. In particular, the 95% confidence interval is between 22% and 86% of their mean supporter's movement in the opposite direction. This quite striking finding is reinforced by the FE estimate in Model 2, though the standard errors are larger.

Figure 1 consists of two columns of graphs. On the left hand side, the effect of the mean supporter's shift is shown. On the right hand side, the same is depicted for the mean voter. Y-axes always show the marginal effect of the opinion changes, *ceteris paribus*, on a party's policy position. In all figures, positive values on the y-axis indicate responsiveness and its values can be interpreted as percentages of responsiveness if multiplied by 100. The x-axes show the different types of par-

[13] Party-specific intercepts are not shown.

ties. Finally, black circles indicate the estimated marginal effect of the FEGLS models and white circles the corresponding estimates of the FE model. In both cases, bars give the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.

[Figure 1 here]

Turning now to inclusive parties, a first glance at the [*Inclusiveness (t) x mean supporter's shift (t-1 to t)*] estimates in Model 1 and 2 in Table 1 are positively signed, demonstrates that inclusive parties are relatively more responsive to their supporters than exclusive parties. As clearly shown by the right pair of bars in the left panel of Figure 1, both estimation techniques provide strong support that inclusive parties are responsive to their mean supporter's opinion shifts. None of these intervals includes zero and hence they provide strong support for the Inclusiveness Hypothesis. Indeed, the average inclusive party is found to respond to 35% to the mean supporter's policy shifts, and this estimate is statistically significant ($\beta = .35$; s.e. = .10; $p < .01$). Model 2 predicts a smaller effect, though this effect is still consistent with the general findings.

With respect to mean voters' opinion shifts, there is some evidence that exclusive parties are responsive to the mean voter position as shown by the estimates on [*Mean voter's shift (t-1 to t)*] in Model 1, being positive and statistically significant ($\beta = .69$; $p < .10$). However, in Model 2 the corresponding coefficient is negative with a large standard error. These observations raise concern about evidence supporting the Exclusiveness Hypothesis. The null hypothesis that exclusive parties do not respond to the median voter cannot convincingly be rejected. Both of the left bars in the right panel in Figure 1 clarify this observation. The positive coefficient of the FEGLS model (not their standard errors) is consistent with the Exclusiveness Hypothesis. The FE results, on the other hand, indicate point estimates as well as standard errors that do not support the Exclusiveness Hypothesis.

Concerning mean voter responsiveness for inclusive parties, the estimation techniques return point estimates with different algebraic signs for [*Inclusiveness (t) x mean voter's shift (t-1 to t)*] (β_{FEGLS}= .16; β_{FE}= -.18). And, in both cases, the confidence intervals clearly contain zero. Thus, one has to conclude that there is no clear pattern of responsiveness or anti-responsiveness for inclusive parties to the mean voter.

To summarize, the analysis reveals that inclusiveness in party leadership selection does indeed influence how parties shift their positions. In line with the Inclusiveness Hypotheses, I find that inclusive parties respond to opinion shifts of their mean supporters while exclusive parties do not show this pattern. Second, there is weak evidence that exclusive parties respond to the mean voter, but this evidence is very sensitive to the model specification (FEGLS v. FE). Finally, there is no evidence that inclusive parties systematically respond to movements in the mean voter opinion. The next section evaluates whether these results are robust to alternative model specifications.

Robustness Tests

Party-System Effects. The Exclusiveness Hypothesis relies on incentives for parties to appeal to the median voter position. In two-party systems this causal link is well established as winning a plurality of seats will almost necessarily lead to government formation (Downs 1957). However, in multi-party systems finding a connection to the median voter is not as straightforward. Cox (1990b) shows that increasing the district magnitude exerts 'centrifugal' effects on parties, i.e., it causes them to adopt more divergent positions. Similarly increasing the number of (viable) competitors provides additional incentives to not respond to the median voter (Merrill and Adams 2002; Adams and Merrill 2006). Moreover, since coalitions are much more likely in multi-party settings, participation in government may be achieved without winning a plurality of seats. In contrast, it may be necessary to adjust one's policy position in order to be a viable partner in a coalition (Schofield 1993). On the other hand, in line with some theoretical arguments (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988)

empirical studies do not find that parties generally respond to these centrifugal incentives (Ezrow 2008b; Calvo and Hellwig 2011, see also Dow 2011).

In order to test whether the conclusions drawn hold across two- and multi-party systems, I re-estimate a split version of the sample. All parties that compete in elections that lead to a party-system whose effective number of parties in parliament is smaller or equal to 2.5 are classified as members of two-party systems.[14] Data on effective party numbers in parliament are taken from Gallagher and Mitchell (2008).[15]

The results in Models 3 and 4 reveal that in two-party systems conclusions about the Inclusiveness Hypothesis depend on the model one relies on to draw them: As shown by the right bars in the upper left panel of Figure 2, inclusive parties respond positively to their mean supporter's policy shifts according to the FEGLS estimates. The estimated marginal effects of the FE model are rather similar to the FEGLS estimates, however, the FE standard errors are significantly larger. Thus, the Inclusiveness Hypothesis is not clearly corroborated by the FE model. Nevertheless, these results are suggestive. Given the few observations present in the sample in two-party systems (24 cases), it is not surprising that standard errors are slightly inflated.

[14] If all party systems with less than three effective parties are considered as two-party systems, results for two-party systems become less distinct and the likelihood of type ore errors has to be increased to 10% in order to draw the same conclusions as before. Major changes occur only in the FE estimates for responsiveness to the mean voter's opinion shifts. Evaluating this definition of multi-party systems, especially FE estimates become more distinct and hence exclusive parties are found to be anti-responsive to both, mean voter and mean supporter. In contrast, conclusions based on the FEGLS results are almost identical in both scenarios.

[15] In Germany, CDU and CSU are treated as one party since they always form a 'Fraktion' together and do not run against each other in the electoral competition.

[Figure 2 here]

Surprisingly, Model 3 as well as Model 4 report significant and strong effects in the opposite direction for responsiveness to the mean supporter for exclusive parties, as shown by the negative coefficient on the [*Mean supporter's shift (t-1 to t)*] variable. Concerning responsiveness to the mean voter, exclusive parties are – according to the coefficients of [*Mean voter's shift (t-1 to t)*] in Models 3 and 4 – found by both estimation techniques to behave as described by the Exclusive Hypothesis. In fact, the confidence intervals of both approaches include 1 and thus the point of perfect responsiveness that would represent the classical Downsian (1957) party in a two-party system. These observations of almost perfect responsiveness to the mean voter combined with almost perfect anti-responsiveness to the mean supporter may be interpreted as indication of a trade-off between these two types of responsiveness. Overall, the Inclusiveness Hypothesis as well as the Exclusiveness Hypothesis hold true for the two-party case.

Models 5-6 in Table 1 show the corresponding results for the multi-party case. The findings for responsiveness to the mean party supporter are very similar to the baseline model what is not surprising as only roughly 10% of the baseline model's cases are excluded. Even though the size of the estimated effects in the FE model shrink, they still corroborate the Inclusiveness Hypothesis as the right pair of bars in the lower left panel in Figure 2 reveals.

On the other hand, the left pair of bars in the lower right panel in Figure 2 indicates that according to both estimation techniques exclusive parties are not responsive to the mean voter. It is striking that the FEGLS estimates are very close to zero and that its standard errors are compared to the two-party set-up (Model 3) very large despite being based on roughly ten times as many observations. A very similar observation can be made for the FE estimates. Thus the Exclusiveness Hypothesis is not supported by these parameter estimates.

Niche Parties. Ezrow et al. (2011) have recently argued that niche parties, or parties that belong to the Communist, Nationalist or Green party families, are more responsive to their supporters than mainstream parties. In order to test for this alternative explanation, I include a dummy variable which equals 1 if a party is among one of the mentioned groups in the CMP data set (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006) and 0 otherwise. Moreover, I interact [*Niche*] with each variable, [*Mean supporter's shift (t-1 to t)*] and [*Mean voter's shift (t-1 to t*)].

A problem that arises from this procedure is that [*Niche*] is constant over time and hence will necessarily be dropped if a fixed-effects model with party-specific effects is estimated. Ezrow et al. (2011) circumvent this fact by shifting to a higher level, namely countries instead of parties, as panels. I adopt their approach because it proves to eliminate most of the party-specific effects.[16]

In order to show that the results are not driven by the fact that country-specific effects differ from party-specific effects, I estimate the model specification as FEGLS, FE and Random Effects (RE) model. The first two models eliminate country-specific heterogeneity. The latter estimates party-specific heterogeneity. Since FE and RE model return almost the same results that differ only in their standard errors, I report only the results of the RE model in Model 8 in Table 1 because its

[16] To draw this conclusion, I estimated the baseline model with the FE estimator and computed the party-specific heterogeneity that the model isolated. Subsequently, I used the same model specification to obtain other types of specific heterogeneity and regressed the former on the latter. Using decade-specific heterogeneity, explains less than 1% of the baseline model's unobserved party-specific heterogeneity. Moreover, grouping parties according to their party families into the categories 'left', 'centrist' and 'right' accounts for mere 4% of the same. (Coding follows Ezrow et al. 2011 (fn. 20) with 'ecologist' and 'communist' as left parties, 'special issue' parties as centrist and 'nationalists' and 'ethnic-regional' parties as right-wing.) Finally, I find country-specific heterogeneity, with $R^2 = .13$, to be the best predictor of party-specific heterogeneity.

standard errors are larger in most cases and thus conclusions are more conservative. Regarding Models 7-8 in Table 1 and comparing them to Models 1-2 respectively, although the coefficients and significance levels change, the substantive conclusions concerning the hypotheses do not change when we control for niche parties. In both model specifications, responsiveness to the mean supporter is strictly positive for inclusive parties. This corroborates the Inclusiveness Hypothesis. Again, neither model finds exclusive parties to be responsive to the mean voter. Hence, the Exclusiveness Hypothesis is not corroborated by the data.

[Figure 3 here]

Furthermore, the second row in Figure 3 reveals that the observation Ezrow et al. (2011) made, namely that niche parties differ from mainstream parties in terms of responsiveness to the mean voter and the mean supporter, can be replicated if one controls for inclusiveness by the FE model only.[17] Therefore, the conclusion for the hypotheses has to be that even if one controls for niche parties, inclusiveness remains decisive in whether parties respond to their mean supporter. These findings support the Inclusiveness Hypothesis. This analysis provides indication that niche parties may be "fundamentally different from mainstream parties" (Adams et al. 2004) because they happen to be inclusive.

Alternation. Another possibility is that parties naturally alternate their positions in between elections. As Budge (1994; see also Budge et al. 2010) argues, parties may shift their positions back and forth because of uncertainty. To address this possibility the lagged dependent variable was included

[17] The FE model finds the marginal effect of the mean supporter's policy shift on a party's policy movement to be positive. Moreover, this result is significant with 95% confidence intervals.

in Models 2, 4, 6 and 8. If parties alternate, the coefficient on [Change party position (t-2 to t-1)] should be equal to -1. As Table 1 shows, in fact [Change party position (t-2 to t-1)] is statistically significant and negative whenever included in a model. However, its effect size is far from 1, which suggests that it is autocorrelation in the error terms that drives the result. More importantly, including the lagged dependent variable does not change the substantive results reported above.

Conclusion

This study derives a model of intra-party competition for party leadership. Since candidates need the support of the selectorate, which is defined as the group of all party members who are entitled to vote in the party leadership selection (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002, 2003), they are generally responsive to the median selector's ideal policy position. However, if selectors are offered office benefits, they compromise their policy ideals for office. Thus the share of office candidates in the selectorate determines how close the party's position has to be to the median selector's position. Since institutions are crucial for enfranchising party members and thus determine the denominator of the offices-to-selectors ratio by setting the selectorate's size, they are decisive for parties' policy positions.

The empirical analysis evaluates these expectations against 228 cases from six countries from 1972-2003. Inclusive parties that choose their leader based on widespread membership (e.g. grass root dominated party conferences or grass root elections) respond to shifts in the mean party supporter position. This finding holds across two-party and multi-party systems. Moreover, this result holds controlling for niche parties and policy alternation. In contrast, exclusive parties whose leadership selection based on a few members are not responsive to their supporters. Finally, there is mixed evidence reported that exclusive parties respond to shifts in the mean voter position.

These results have important implications for future research. With respect to coalition behav-

ior (Giannetti and Benoit 2009), for instance, exclusive parties should be more flexible to accept compromises and hence more likely to be members of a coalition government. Similarly, inclusive parties should be less forbearing with its leaders if they implement unpopular policies from the party members' point of view, and less likely compromise their ideology to join a governing coalition. Hence, theories that combine intra-party politics and coalition politics should analyse the effect of intra-party democracy on the willingness to join coalitions.

An obvious implication of this study is that countries that produce legislation that affects intra-party institutions will affect patterns of party responsiveness. Powell (2004) highlights the delegation of interests in democracies via a 'chain of responsiveness'. Müller (2000) points to the crucial role of parties in these delegation processes. This paper adds to this knowledge the insight that intra-party institutions affect whose preferences dominate a party's policy. Hence, political systems that impose inclusive party structure on parties by law (e.g., Germany) should have different patterns of responsiveness to the mean voter than political systems without these restrictions.

Lastly, Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis (2011) raise doubt about the explanation that niche parties, i.e., parties from Communist, Nationalist or Ecologist party families, respond to their mean supporters rather than the mean voter because of 'ideological' aspects (Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow et al. 2011). In this paper, I not only make their argument more specific by pointing out the importance of enfranchising institutions in leadership selections, yet, I also test it against the alternative niche-party approach. As a result, I find strong indication that niche parties are responsive to their mean supporters because they are internally democratic parties. Nevertheless, this does not prove that the ideological explanation is false. It rather raises the question whether certain party ideologies lead to specific internal institutions which, in turn, lead to responsiveness to the mean voter or the mean supporter.

Appendix: List of Parties' Inclusiveness in Election Years

Country	Name of Party	Election Year										
Denmark		**1975**	**1977**	**1979**	**1981**	**1985**	**1987**	**1988**	**1990**	**1994**	**1998**	**2001**
	SF Socialist People's Party	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	SD Social Democratic Party	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	CD Centre Democrats	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-
	RV Radical Party	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	V Liberals	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	KrF Christian People's Party	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	KF Conservative People's Party	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	FP Progress Party	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-
Belgium		**1977**	**1978**	**1981**	**1985**	**1987**	**1991**	**1995**	**1999**	**2003**		
	ECOLO Francophone Ecologists	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	1		
	SP Flemish Socialist Party	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0			
	PS Francophone Socialist Party	-		0	1	1	1	1	1	1		
	PVV Party of Liberty and Progress	-	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-		
	PRL Francophone Liberals	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	-	-		
	CVP Christian People's Party	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
	PSC Christian Social Party	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
	Flemish Christian People's Union	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-		
	VU People's Union	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-		
Netherlands		**1977**	**1981**	**1982**	**1986**	**1989**	**1998**					
	PPR Radical Political Party	-	1	1	1		-					
	PvdA Labour Party	1	1	1	1	1	1					
	D'66 Democrats 66	1	1	1	1	1	-					
	VVD People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	1	1	1	1	1	-					
	CDA Christian Democratic Appeal	-	1	1	1	1	-					

Country	Name of Party	Election Year							
Germany		**1976**	**1980**	**1983**	**1987**	**1990**	**1994**	**1998**	**2002**
	90 and Greens Alliance ’90 and Greens				1	1	1	1	1
	SPD Social Democratic Party	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	FDP Free Democratic Party	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	CDU and CSU Christian Democratic Union and Social Union	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
United Kingdom		**1979**	**1983**	**1987**	**1992**	**1997**	**2001**		
	Labour Party	0	1	1	1	1	1		
	Liberal Party	1	1	1	-	-	-		
	Conservative Party	0	0	0	0	0	1		
Ireland		**1977**	**1981**	**1982**	**1987**	**1989**	**1992**	**1997**	**2002**
	WP Workers’ Party	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-
	LP Labour Party	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	-
	PD Progressive Democrats	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	-
	Fine Gael	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0
	Fianna Fail	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-

0 = Exclusive, 1 = Inclusive, - = not in sample. Sources: Katz and Mair (1992) and Kenig (2009).

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Table 1: Estimated Effects on Parties' Policy Shifts

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Baseline Model		Two-Party Model		Multi-Party Model		Niche-Party Model	
Inclusiveness (t)	-0.054	-0.33	-0.55***	-0.44**	-0.00097	0.28**	-0.0062	0.0064
	(0.10)	(0.29)	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.18)
Mean supporter's shift (t-1 to t)	-0.55***	-0.71**	-0.74***	-1.00**	-0.55***	-0.59	-0.39*	-0.47
	(0.16)	(0.34)	(0.07)	(0.35)	(0.18)	(0.38)	(0.22)	(0.30)
Inclusiveness (t) x	0.90***	0.93**	2.13***	2.43	0.89***	0.81**	0.63**	0.66**
Mean supporter's shift (t-1 to t)	(0.19)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(1.52)	(0.21)	(0.38)	(0.25)	(0.30)
Mean voter's shift (t-1 to t)	0.69*	-0.36	1.10***	0.80**	-0.35	-1.63*	0.44	-0.13
	(0.39)	(0.77)	(0.06)	(0.26)	(0.37)	(0.83)	(0.43)	(0.71)
Inclusiveness (t) x	-0.87**	0.52	-2.09***	-1.83*	0.45	1.97**	-0.37	0.30
Mean voter's shift (t-1 to t)	(0.43)	(0.82)	(0.25)	(0.80)	(0.43)	(0.86)	(0.47)	(0.78)
Niche							-0.094	-0.14***
							(0.07)	(0.05)
Niche x							0.70***	0.69***
Mean supporter's shift (t-1 to t)							(0.23)	(0.17)
Niche x							-0.79**	-0.91***
Mean voter's shift (t-1 to t)							(0.35)	(0.32)
Change party position (t-2 to t-1)		-0.39***		-0.45**		-0.33***		-0.35***
		(0.05)		(0.18)		(0.06)		(0.06)
Observations	228	221	21	24	204	197	228	221
Model	FEGLS	FE	FEGLS	FE	FEGLS	FE	FEGLS	RE
Group	Party	Party	Party	Party	Party	Party	Country	Party
Group Dummies	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Number of Parties	33	33	6	9	30	30	33	33

* p< 0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, two sided tests. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Party and country dummies are not shown. FEGLS = Fixed Effects General Least Squares, FE = Fixed Effects Least Squares, RE = Random Effects Least Squares.

Figure 1. Marginal Effects of Opinion Changes on Changes in Parties' Policy Positions in the Baseline Model



Notes: Black circles indicate FEGLS estimates (Model 1), white circles FE estimates (Model 2). Bars give robust 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Opinion Changes on Changes in Parties' Policy Positions in the Two-Party and Multi-Party Models



Note: Black circles indicate FEGLS estimates (Model 3 and Model 5), white circles FE estimates (Model 4 and Model 6). Bars give robust 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Opinion Changes on Changes in Parties' Policy Positions in the Niche-Party Model



Note: Black circles indicate FEGLS estimates (Model 7), white circles RE estimates (Model 8). Bars give robust 95% confidence intervals.