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HS Ausgewählte Themen der Vergleichenden Regierungslehre: Government Formation and Government Termination

Spring Term 2020

Time and place: Tuesdays, 12noon-1.30pm, building: B6, 30-32, room: 209

First session: 11th February 2020

Office hours: Tuesday, 2.30m-3.30pm, building: A5, room: A214 (ring bell to get access to corridor)

This seminar has a substantive and a skill development goal. Substantively, this seminar will give you an overview of theoretical and empirical findings in the political science literature on government formation and government termination. It will focus on both fields' development from its naïve early approaches to more sophisticated methodological and theoretical endeavors. It will enable you to explain (failure of) government formation attempts, as well as governments' (expected) survival time.

The seminar will also develop your skills to write a thesis in Comparative Politics. Throughout the seminar and in its assignments, you will develop ideas for your final paper, comment on others' ideas, and write a paper yourself. These tasks will prepare you for writing a Bachelor thesis in Comparative Politics.

The first half of the seminar will focus on government formation. We will look into theoretical approaches, and into statistical methods to evaluate these theories. The second part will focus on government termination both empirically and theoretically. The seminar will include two sessions on the statistical methods needed to evaluate theories of government formation (conditional logit models), and government termination (event history methods).

Prior to the seminars, participants need to be familiar with the basics of rational choice theory and OLS regressions.

You need to register for this class in advance via the Studierendenportal at <https://portal2.uni-mannheim.de>.

ECTS points: 5

All **course materials** can be accessed at <https://portal2.uni-mannheim.de>.

I will send out emails to your university e-mail accounts, so please check them regularly.

Requirements to pass:

1. Constant and active participation in class:

- It is mandatory to attend classes and participate in them actively.
- You have to read the assigned literature before coming to class.

2. Presentation:

- Every participant will (jointly with somebody else) give a presentation on an assigned paper.
- Your task is to present the paper critically, and to link it to the context that we have discussed so far. This includes describing and explaining
 - the paper's goal(s),
 - its context,
 - the means it uses to accomplish its goal(s), and
 - the results it presents.
- Your task also includes deriving a sketch for a final paper you could write based on the paper you present including
 - a research question and its context in the literature (i.e., what is new about your research and why does it matter),
 - a theoretical argument,
 - an empirical approach to test your theoretical implications.
- Presentations should take 25 mins.

3. Final paper: (*determines your final grade*)

- Maximally 4000 words main text (i.e., excluding cover page, graphs, tables and references but including footnotes and endnotes).
- Write an introduction that summarizes your contribution in the context of the literature.
- Present a theoretical expectation.
- Test your theoretical expectation empirically.
- Submit by email no later than 31th July 2020 at midnight including cover sheet, references, and the *Erklärung für Hausarbeiten*. Late submission will be penalized.

Course Content and Reading List

* denotes mandatory readings for class

+ denotes readings for presentations

Session 1 — 11th February — Introduction, administrative issues

Session 2 — 18th February — Theories of Government Formation I

*Muthoo, A. (2000). “A non-technical introduction to bargaining theory”. *WORLD ECONOMICS* 1(2):145-166.

*Strøm, K. W., & Nyblade, B. (2007). Coalition theory and government formation. In *The Oxford handbook of comparative politics*.

Laver, Michael. (1997). *Private desires, political action : An invitation to the politics of rational choice* (1. publ. ed.). London. Chapter 7.

+Warwick, Paul V. (2000). “Policy Horizons in West European Parliamentary Systems”. *European Journal of Political Research* 38(1):37–61.

Session 3 — 25th February — Theories of Government Formation II

*Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. (1990). “Coalitions and cabinet government”. *American Political Science Review* 84(3):873–90.

*Carrubba, Clifford J., and Craig Volden. (2000). “Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions”. *American Journal of Political Science* 44(2): 261-277.

+Bergman, Torbjörn. (1993). “Formation rules and minority governments”. *European Journal of Political Research*, 23(1):55-66.

Schofield, Norman. (1993). “Political competition and multiparty coalition governments”. *European Journal of Political Research* 23:1–33.

Session 4 — 3rd March — Theories of Government Formation III

*Warwick, Paul V. and Druckman, James N. 2006. “The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship.” *European Journal of Political Research* 45(4): 635–665.

+Laver, M., De Marchi, S., & Mutlu, H. (2011). “Negotiation in legislatures over government formation”. *Public Choice* 147(3-4):285-304.

Session 5 — 10th March — Statistics I: Maximum Likelihood Estimation, Discrete Choice

Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2009). *Introductory Econometrics. A Modern Approach*. 4th edition. South-Western Press,. Chapter 17.

Session 6 — 17th March — COVID-19

Session 7 — 24th March — COVID-19

Session 8 — 31st March — Empirical Evaluation of Government Formation Theories

*Martin, Lanny W, and Randolph T Stevenson. (2001). “Government formation in parliamentary democracies”. *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1): 33–50.

Session 9 — 21st April — Statistics II: Event History Models

Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., & Jones, B. S. (2004). *Event history modeling: A guide for social scientists*. Cambridge University Press.

Session 10 — 28th April — Other Perspectives on Government Formation

+Golder, S. N. (2006). “Pre-electoral coalition formation in parliamentary democracies”. *British Journal of Political Science* 36(2):193-212.

+Glasgow, G., Golder, M., & Golder, S. N. (2011). “Who “wins”? Determining the party of the prime minister”. *American Journal of Political Science* 55(4): 937-954.

Session 11 — 5th May — Events or Attributes?

+Warwick, P. (1992). “Ideological diversity and government survival in Western European parliamentary democracies”. *Comparative Political Studies* 25(3): 332-361.

+Browne, E. C., Fren dreis, J. P., & Gleiber, D. W. (1986). “The process of cabinet dissolution: An exponential model of duration and stability in western democracies”. *American Journal of Political Science* 628-650.

Session 12 — 12th May — Government Termination: Strategic Approach II

*Lupia, A., & Strøm, K. (1995). “Coalition termination and the strategic timing of parliamentary elections”. *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 648-665.

+Diermeier, D., & Stevenson, R. T. (1999). “Cabinet survival and competing risks”. *American Journal of Political Science*, 1051-1068.

Session 13 — 19th May — Consequences of Government Termination

+Schleiter, P., & Morgan-Jones, E. (2009). “Constitutional power and competing risks: Monarchs, presidents, prime ministers, and the termination of East and West European cabinets”. *American Political Science Review* 103(3): 496-512.

+Tavits, M. (2008). “The role of parties’ past behavior in coalition formation”. *American Political Science Review* 102(4): 495-507.

Session 14 — 26th May — Summary, Outlook & Evaluation